Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action

Theoria 22 (1):25-33 (2009)
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Abstract

Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge.

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10.1387/theoria.479

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Josep-Lluís Prades
Universitat de Girona

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Humean theory of motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.
Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.
Natural Goodness.Philippa Foot & Peter Geach - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):621-631.

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