Truth as an Epistemic Notion

Topoi 31 (1):9-16 (2012)
Abstract
What is the appropriate notion of truth for sentences whose meanings are understood in epistemic terms such as proof or ground for an assertion? It seems that the truth of such sentences has to be identified with the existence of proofs or grounds, and the main issue is whether this existence is to be understood in a temporal sense as meaning that we have actually found a proof or a ground, or if it could be taken in an abstract, tenseless sense. Would the latter alternative amount to realism with respect to proofs or grounds in a way that would be contrary to the supposedly anti-realistic standpoint underlying the epistemic understanding of linguistic expressions? Before discussing this question, I shall consider reasons for construing linguistic meaning epistemically and relations between such reasons and reasons for taking an anti-realist point of view towards the discourse in question
Keywords Truth  Intuitionism  Anti-realism  Meaning-theory
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6
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References found in this work BETA
Elements of Intuitionism.Michael A. E. Dummett - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Understanding and Inference.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):249–293.
Meaning Approached Via Proofs.Dag Prawitz - 2006 - Synthese 148 (3):507-524.

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