Studia Logica 57 (1):73 - 90 (1996)
This paper compares two ways of formalising defeasible deontic reasoning, both based on the view that the issues of conflicting obligations and moral dilemmas should be dealt with from the perspective of nonmonotonic reasoning. The first way is developing a special nonmonotonic logic for deontic statements. This method turns out to have some limitations, for which reason another approach is recommended, viz. combining an already existing nonmonotonic logic with a deontic logic. As an example of this method the language of Reiter's default logic is extended to include modal expressions, after which the argumentation framework in default logic of [20, 22] is used to give a plausible logical analysis of moral dilemmas and prima facie obligations.
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References found in this work BETA
Ideality, Sub-Ideality and Deontic Logic.Andrew J. I. Jones & Ingmar Pörn - 1985 - Synthese 65 (2):275 - 290.
Moral Dilemmas and Nonmonotonic Logic.John F. Horty - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1):35 - 65.
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