Cognition and tool use

Mind and Language 13 (4):513–547 (1998)
Authors
Beth Preston
University of Georgia
Abstract
Tool use rivals language as an important domain of cognitive phenomena, and so as a source of insight into the nature of cognition in general. But the favoured current definition of tool use is inadequate because it does not carve the phenomena of interest at the joints. Heidegger's notion of equipment provides a more adequate theoretical framework. But Heidegger's account leads directly to a non-individualist view of the nature of cognition. Thus non-individualism is supported by concrete considerations about the nature of tools and tool use.
Keywords artifacts  function  tools  equipment
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0017.00090
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A Process Ontology.Haines Brown - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (3):291-312.

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