Authors
Ryan Preston-Roedder
Occidental College
Abstract
It is a commonplace that there are limits to the ways we can permissibly treat people, even in the service of good ends. For example, we may not steal someone’s wallet, even if we plan to donate the contents to famine relief, or break a promise to help a colleague move, even if we encounter someone else on the way whose need is somewhat more urgent. In other words, we should observe certain constraints against mistreating people, where a constraint is a moral principle that we should not violate, even when that is the only way to prevent further, similar violations or other, greater evils. But, despite its intuitive appeal, the view that there are constraints has drawn considerable criticism, and attempts to provide a rationale for constraints have been, at best, substantially incomplete. In this paper, I develop a novel rationale for constraints that fills important gaps left by views in the literature. The account helps make sense of constraints by identifying a morally significant relation that we bear to people when, and only when, we observe certain constraints against mistreating them. Put roughly, observing these constraints is a condition for being worthy of a form of trust that I call civic trust, and being worthy of such trust is an essential part of living with others in the sort of harmony that characterizes morally permissible interaction. By focusing, in ways other accounts do not, on the role that observing constraints plays in our psychological lives, this approach not only makes the structure of constraints more intelligible, but also helps us better appreciate the force of our reason to observe constraints, and better understand the kind of moral community to which we should aspire.
Keywords Trust  Constraints  Deontology  Doing and Allowing  Double Effect  Rights
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas M. Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
Humble Trust.Jason D’Cruz - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):933-953.
Trust Within Limits.Jason D’Cruz - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2):240-250.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Creating Trust.Robert C. Solomon - 1998 - Business Ethics Quarterly 8 (2):205-232.
Trust.Carolyn McLeod - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Trust: Self-Interest and the Common Good.Marek Kohn - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
The Ethical Limits of Trust in Business Relations.Bryan W. Husted - 1998 - Business Ethics Quarterly 8 (2):233-248.
Trust It!D. Z. Phillips - 1999 - Bijdragen 60 (4):380-392.
Trust in Strangers, Trust in Friends.Jessica Miller - 2003 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 10 (1):17-22.
Puzzles About Trust.Doran Smolkin - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):431-449.
Trust and the Limits of Contract.Celeste M. Friend - 1995 - Dissertation, City University of New York

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-10-16

Total views
660 ( #7,500 of 2,349,895 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
95 ( #5,644 of 2,349,895 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes