Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138-140 (1996)

Abstract
Barresi & Moore's “intentional schema” will not do the work of “theory of mind.” Their model will account neither for fundamental facts of social competence, such as the social attributions of the 10-month-old infant, nor the possibility that, though having a theory of mind, the chimpanzee's theory is “weaker” than the human's.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x00041984
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