Los propósitos de razonar, ilustrados con el argumento externista anti-escéptico de Putnam

Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (1):55-74 (2012)
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Abstract

Desarrollo varias hipótesis sobre los propósitos de la argumentación racional, parcialmente inspiradas en el análisis de Jackson sobre el concepto de petitio principii. Destaco como especialmente relevante entre tales propósitos la referencia a los potenciales destinatarios de una argumentación. Ilustro la discusión con un caso concreto: el argumento elaborado por Putnam para demostrar que no somos cerebros en una cubeta. Presento una versión de ese argumento y lo defiendo frente a una posible crítica que lo acusa de prejuzgar la cuestión.I work out some hypothesis on the purposes of rational arguing, partly inspired by Jackson’s analysis of the concept of petitio principii. It is especially relevant among such purposes the reference to the potential intended addressee of an argument. The discussion is illustrated with a concrete example: Putnam’s proofthat we are not brains in a vat. I present a version of Putnam’s proof and defend it from a possible criticism which accuses it of begging the question

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Manuel Perez Otero
Universitat de Barcelona

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A verisimilitudinarian analysis of the Linda paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.

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