Critica 37 (110):35-52 (2005)

Authors
Diana I. Pérez
University of Buenos Aires
Abstract
In this paper I shall discuss McGinn's transcendental naturalism and the reasons he gives in order to show that philosophy will always be just a cluster of mysteries without answers. I shall show that the three main arguments he gives for TN are inconclusive and that a modular architecture of the mind he presupposes is not committed to the epistemic thesis of TN, the idea that we are "cognitively closed" to answering some questions about consciousness, meaning, knowledge and the like. /// En este trabajo discutiré el naturalismo trascendental que defiende McGinn y las razones que ofrece para mostrar que la filosofía será por siempre un cúmulo de misterios sin respuesta. Mostraré que ninguno de los tres argumentos principales que McGinn propone en favor de su positión es concluyente y que la estructura modular de la mente que presupone no está comprometida con la tesis epistémica del NT, esto es, con la idea de que estamos "cognitivamente cerrados" para responder preguntas acerca de la conciencia, el significado, la libertad, el conocimiento, etc.
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