Perceptual content is indexed to attention

Synthese 194 (10):4039-4054 (2017)

Authors
Adrienne Prettyman
Bryn Mawr College
Abstract
Attention seems to raise a problem for pure representationalism, the view that phenomenal content supervenes on representational content. The problem is that shifts of attention sometimes seem to bring about a change in phenomenal content without a change in representational content. I argue that the representationalist can meet this challenge, but that doing so requires a new view of the representational content of perception. On this new view, the representational content of perception is always relative to a way of attending. I call this the attention-indexed view of perceptual content.
Keywords Attention  Consciousness  Perception  Representation
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1125-x
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References found in this work BETA

The Representational Character of Experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
Attention and Mental Paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.

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Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Precision.Adrienne Prettyman - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):923-944.

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