Noûs 52 (1):196-215 (2018)

Alejandro Pérez Carballo
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
It seems natural to think of an unwilling addict as having a pattern of preferences that she does not endorse—preferences that, in some sense, she does not ‘identify’ with. Following Frankfurt (1971), Jeffrey (1974) proposed a way of modeling those features of an agent’s preferences by appealing to preferences among preferences.Th„e addict’s preferences are preferences she does not prefer to have. I argue that this modeling suggestion will not do, for it follows from plausible assumptions that a minimally rational agent must prefer those first-order preferences she actually has. I close by considering two different but related ways to think about the initial phenomenon.
Keywords preferences  second-order preferences  second-order desires  fragmentation  rationality
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12155
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References found in this work BETA

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Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.

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