Rationality & Second‐Order Preferences

Noûs 52 (1):196-215 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


It seems natural to think of an unwilling addict as having a pattern of preferences that she does not endorse—preferences that, in some sense, she does not ‘identify’ with. Following Frankfurt (1971), Jeffrey (1974) proposed a way of modeling those features of an agent’s preferences by appealing to preferences among preferences.Th„e addict’s preferences are preferences she does not prefer to have. I argue that this modeling suggestion will not do, for it follows from plausible assumptions that a minimally rational agent must prefer those first-order preferences she actually has. I close by considering two different but related ways to think about the initial phenomenon.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Higher-order preferences and the master rationality motive.Keith E. Stanovich - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):111 – 127.
Preferences and Well-Being.Serena Olsaretti (ed.) - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
Where do preferences come from?Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):613-637.
The impossibility of rational politics?Peter Stone - 2003 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 2 (2):239-263.
Co-operative solutions to the prisoner's dilemma.Duncan Macintosh - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (3):309 - 321.
Preference-Revision and the Paradoxes of Instrumental Rationality.Duncan MacIntosh - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):503-529.


Added to PP

163 (#114,053)

6 months
10 (#250,275)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alejandro Pérez Carballo
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.

View all 49 references / Add more references