Noûs 52 (1):196-215 (2018)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
It seems natural to think of an unwilling addict as having a pattern of preferences that she does not endorse—preferences that, in some sense, she does not ‘identify’ with. Following Frankfurt (1971), Jeffrey (1974) proposed a way of modeling those features of an agent’s preferences by appealing to preferences among preferences.The addict’s preferences are preferences she does not prefer to have. I argue that this modeling suggestion will not do, for it follows from plausible assumptions that a minimally rational agent must prefer those first-order preferences she actually has. I close by considering two different but related ways to think about the initial phenomenon.
|
Keywords | preferences second-order preferences second-order desires fragmentation rationality |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2018 |
DOI | 10.1111/nous.12155 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
View all 47 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Value Commitment, Resolute Choice, and the Normative Foundations of Behavioural Welfare Economics.C. Tyler DesRoches - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (4):562-577.
Akrasia and the Desire to Become Someone Else: Venturinha on Moral Matters.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1705-1711.
Similar books and articles
Second-Order Preferences and Instrumental Rationality.Donald W. Bruckner - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (4):367-385.
Higher-Order Preferences and the Master Rationality Motive.Keith E. Stanovich - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):111 – 127.
A Paretian Liberal Dilemma Without Collective Rationality.S. Subramanian - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (3):323-332.
Can an Irrational Agent Reason Himself to Rationality?Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2010 - Working Papers- The Choice Group.
Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality.Duncan MacIntosh - 1998 - In Peter Danielson (ed.), Modeling Rationality, Morality and Evolution; Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science, Volume 7. Oxford University Press.
The Real Puzzle of the Self-Torturer: Uncovering a New Dimension of Instrumental Rationality.Chrisoula Andreou - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):562-575.
Where Do Preferences Come From?Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):613-637.
Time-Biases and Rationality: The Philosophical Perspectives on Empirical Research About Time Preferences.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2016 - In Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Brożek & Łukasz Kurek (eds.), The Emergence of Normative Orders. Copernicus Press. pp. 149-187.
The Impossibility of Rational Politics?Peter Stone - 2003 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 2 (2):239-263.
The Locality and Globality of Instrumental Rationality: The Normative Significance of Preference Reversals.Brian Kim - 2014 - Synthese 191 (18):4353-4376.
Wilde Heuristics and Rum Tum Tuggers: Preference Indeterminacy and Instability.Mark Alfano - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):5-15.
Co-Operative Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma.Duncan Macintosh - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (3):309 - 321.
Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality.Duncan Macintosh - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (1-2):3-32.
Preference-Revision and the Paradoxes of Instrumental Rationality.Duncan Macintosh - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):503-529.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2016-07-21
Total views
131 ( #88,076 of 2,499,225 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #80,200 of 2,499,225 )
2016-07-21
Total views
131 ( #88,076 of 2,499,225 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #80,200 of 2,499,225 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads