Sobre la respuesta de Carlos Moya al Argumento de la Suerte

Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1) (2018)
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Abstract

On Carlos Moya's Reply to the Argument from Luck Resumen: Esta nota crítica se centra en el argumento de Carlos Moya a favor de la conclusión de que el Argumento de la Suerte representa en realidad un problema mayor para los compatibilistas que para los libertaristas. La Sección 1 introduce brevemente el Argumento de la Suerte. La Sección 2 discute la distinción de Moya entre dos concepciones de deliberación práctica, y propone una manera alternativa a la de Moya de entender la crítica al libertarismo que se basa en la condición de que cualquier decisión libre debe tener una explicación contrastiva. Finalmente, la Sección 3 resume la respuesta libertarista de Moya al Argumento de la Suerte, y sugiere un modelo alternativo de determinismo que Moya podría considerar para completar su argumento. Palabras clave: libre albedrío, Argumento de la Suerte, libertarismo, compatibilismo, explicación contrastiva, determinismo.: This review focuses on Carlos Moya’s argument for the conclusion that the Argument from Luck actually represents a greater problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. Section 1 briefly introduces the Argument from Luck. Section 2 discusses Moya’s distinction between two conceptions of practical deliberation, and suggests a justification that Moya does not consider for the condition that any free decision must have a contrastive explanation. Finally, Section 3 summarizes Moya’s libertarian response to the Argument from Luck, and suggests an alternative model of determinism that Moya might consider to complete his argument. Keywords: free will, Argument from Luck, libertarianism compatibilism, contrastive explanation, determinism.

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Mirja Perez De Calleja
Florida State University

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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century.Neil Levy - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
Rationality in Action: A Symposium.Barry Smith - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66-94.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):129-134.

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