A Defence of Quasi-reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony

Philosophica 78 (2) (2006)
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Abstract

Two key intuitions regarding knowledge are explored: that knowledge is a kind of cognitive achievement and that knowledge excludes luck. It is claimed that a proper understanding of how these intuitions should inform our conception of knowledge leads to some surprising results, not just as regards the theory of knowledge more generally but also as regards the epistemology of testimonial knowledge. In particular, it is argued that this conception of knowledge motivates a new kind of proposal B quasi-reductionism B that can accommodate the motivations behind both reductionist and anti-reductionist accounts of the epistemology of testimonial knowledge.

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Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Knowledge and credit.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.
Epistemological problems of testimony.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Humeanism and the epistemology of testimony.Dan O’Brien - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2647-2669.

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References found in this work

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.John Greco - 2003 - In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press. pp. 111-134.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.
Anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.

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