Synthese 197 (7):2879-2894 (2020)

Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine
Support is canvassed for a new approach to epistemology called anti-risk epistemology. It is argued that this proposal is rooted in the motivations for an existing account, known as anti-luck epistemology, but is superior on a number of fronts. In particular, anti-risk epistemology is better placed than anti-luck epistemology to supply the motivation for certain theoretical moves with regard to safety-based approaches to knowledge. Moreover, anti-risk epistemology is more easily extendable to epistemological questions beyond that in play in the theory of knowledge specifically. A key advantage of the view, however, is that anti-risk epistemology fares much better than anti-luck epistemology when it comes to accounting for the phenomenon of negative epistemic dependence. In particular, anti-risk epistemology is ideally placed to explain why such epistemic dependence is incompatible with knowledge, even when the negative epistemic dependence in play is of a purely modal variety.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1586-6
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3635-3664.

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