Anti-luck epistemology and pragmatic encroachment

Synthese 199 (1-2):715-729 (2020)
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Abstract

A distinctive approach to the theory of knowledge is described, known as anti-luck epistemology. The goal of the paper is to consider whether there are specific features of this proposal that entails that it is committed to pragmatic encroachment, such that whether one counts as having knowledge significantly depends on non-epistemic factors. In particular, the plausibility of the following idea is explored: that since pragmatic factors play an essential role when it comes to the notion of luck, then according to anti-luck epistemology they must likewise play an essential role in our understanding of knowledge as well. It is argued that once anti-luck epistemology is properly understood—where this means, in turn, having the right account of luck in play—then this putative entailment to pragmatic encroachment does not go through.

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Author's Profile

Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action.Carlotta Pavese, Paul Henne & Bob Beddor - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.
On luck and significance.Jesse Hill - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.

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