Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions

Abstract

Should moods be regarded as intentional states, and, if so, what kind of intentional content do they have? I focus on irritability and apprehension, which I examine from the perspective of a teleosemantic theory of content. Eric Lormand has argued that moods are non-intentional states, distinct from emotions; Robert Solomon and Peter Goldie argue that moods are generalised emotions and that they have intentional content of a correspondingly general kind. I present a third model, on which moods are regarded, not as generalised emotions, but as states of vigilance; and I argue that, on this model, moods should be regarded as intentional states of a kind quite distinct from emotions. An advantage of this account is that it allows us to distinguish between a mood of apprehension and an episode of objectless fear

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Author's Profile

Carolyn Price
Open University (UK)

References found in this work

An Argument for Basic Emotions.Paul Ekman - 1992 - Cognition and Emotion 6 (3-4):169-200.
Pushmi-Pullyu Representations.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:185-200.
Toward a Theory of Moods.Eric Lormand - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (May):385-407.
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Can There Be an Epistemology of Moods?Stephen Mulhall - 1996 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 41:191-210.

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Citations of this work

Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Fitting Anxiety and Prudent Anxiety.James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8555-8578.
The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
Emotion.Charlie Kurth - 2022 - Routledge.

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