Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions

Authors
Carolyn Price
Open University (UK)
Abstract
Should moods be regarded as intentional states, and, if so, what kind of intentional content do they have? I focus on irritability and apprehension, which I examine from the perspective of a teleosemantic theory of content. Eric Lormand has argued that moods are non-intentional states, distinct from emotions; Robert Solomon and Peter Goldie argue that moods are generalised emotions and that they have intentional content of a correspondingly general kind. I present a third model, on which moods are regarded, not as generalised emotions, but as states of vigilance; and I argue that, on this model, moods should be regarded as intentional states of a kind quite distinct from emotions. An advantage of this account is that it allows us to distinguish between a mood of apprehension and an episode of objectless fear
Keywords Mood  Emotion  Intentionality  Teleosemantics  Objectless emotion
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The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
The Double Intentionality of Emotional Experience.Tom Cochrane - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1454-1475.

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