Contextualism, Skepticism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres

In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Cambridge MA: Mit Press. pp. 85-104 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Attributer contextualists maintain that the verb 'knows' is context-sensitive in the sense that the truth conditions of a sentence of the form "S knows that p" can be dependent upon the ascriber's context. One natural objection against attributer contextualism is that it confuses the impropriety of certain assertions which ascribe knowledge to agents with the falsity of those assertions. In an influential article, Keith DeRose has defended attributer contextualism against this charge by proposing constraints on what he calls "warranted assertibility manoeuvres" of this sort. This paper argues that, contra DeRose, the warranted assertibility manoeuvre directed at attributer contextualism is able to meet the constraints that DeRose lays down.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,391

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
202 (#63,764)

6 months
2 (#300,121)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Knowledge claims and context: loose use.Wayne A. Davis - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395-438.
Knowledge and implicatures.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4293-4319.
Pragmatic Contextualism.Geoff Pynn - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):26-51.
Normative scorekeeping.Robin McKenna - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):607-625.
Knowledge, intuition and implicature.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2821-2843.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references