Law and Philosophy 29 (6):633-667 (2010)
In the last three decades or so a prominent view among legal philosophers has been that while legal theory is evaluative because it requires making judgments of importance, it can remain morally neutral. This view, which I call the ‘orthodox view’, was first articulated by Joseph Raz and has since been supported by many other prominent legal philosophers. In this essay I examine it, and argue that it is indefensible. I begin by examining the terms ‘description’ and ‘evaluation’, and show that they are ambiguous in a way that most current discussion does not realize. I then rely on this analysis to develop several arguments against the orthodox view. I argue that defenders of the orthodox view have considered only one such argument, and that even with regard to this one their response is unsuccessful
|Keywords||Philosophy Logic Political Science Social Sciences, general Law Theory/Law Philosophy Philosophy of Law|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Rational Responsibility for Preferences and Moral Responsibility for Character Traits.Donald W. Bruckner - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:191-209.
Intentions, All-Out Evaluations and Weakness of the Will.Edmund Henden - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):53-74.
Towards a Better Microeconomic Theory.Richard M. Cyert & Garrel Pottinger - 1979 - Philosophy of Science 46 (2):204-222.
Jeremy Bentham and HLA Hart's ‘Utilitarian Tradition in Jurisprudence’.Philip Schofield - 2010 - Jurisprudence 1 (2):147-167.
Legality's Borders: An Essay in General Jurisprudence.Keith Charles Culver - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Added to index2010-05-12
Total downloads34 ( #147,765 of 2,153,830 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #398,274 of 2,153,830 )
How can I increase my downloads?