From Non-cognitivism to Global Expressivism: Carnap’s Unfinished Journey?

In Christian Dambock & Georg Schiemer (eds.), Rudolf Carnap Handbuch. Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Carnap was one of the first to use the term 'non-cognitivism'. His linguistic pluralism and voluntarism, and his deflationary views of ontology and semantics, are highly congenial to those of us who want to take non-cognitivism in the direction of global expressivism. In his own case, however, this move is in tension with his continued endorsement of what he calls 'the general thesis of logical empiricism', that 'there is no third kind of knowledge besides empirical and logical knowledge.’ So while Carnap clears a path towards global expressivism, he doesn't seem to appreciate what it requires him to leave behind.

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Huw Price
University of Bonn

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