Frege’s Unmanageable Thing

Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):368-413 (2018)

Michael Price
Oxford University (DPhil)
_ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 3, pp 368 - 413 Frege famously maintained that concepts are not objects. A key argument of Frege’s for this view is, in outline, as follows: if we are to account for the unity of thought, concepts must be deemed _unsaturated_; since objects are, by contrast, saturated entities, concepts cannot be objects. The author investigates what can be made of this argument and, in particular, of the unsaturated/saturated distinction it invokes. Systematically exploring a range of reconstructions suggested by Frege’s writings, and drawing on contemporary work, the author illustrates that no plausible reconstruction is forthcoming. In essence, it is altogether unclear how to simultaneously substantiate, on the one hand, the claim that unsaturated entities must be recognized in order to account for unity and, on the other, the claim that unsaturatedness is incompatible with objecthood.
Keywords Frege   concepts   objecthood   unity of the proposition  unsaturatedness
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DOI 10.1163/18756735-000046
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
XIV—Ontological Dependence.Kit Fine - 1995 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1):269-290.
Empty Names.David Braun - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):449-469.
Truth and Meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.

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