Greco on knowledge: Virtues, contexts, achievements

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):437–447 (2008)
Authors
Duncan Pritchard
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
I discuss John Greco's paper 'What's Wrong with Contextualism?', in which he outlines a theory of knowledge which is virtue-theoretic while also being allied to a form of attributor contextualism about 'knows'.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.550.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,830
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth.Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):335-357.
Virtue Epistemology and the Philosophy of Education.James Macallister - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 46 (2):251-270.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth.Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):335-357.
Internalist Virtues and Knowledge.Sarah Wright - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):119-132.
``Virtues in Epistemology".John Greco - 2002 - In Paul Moser (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 287--315.
Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism.Sarah Wright - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):95-114.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
51 ( #126,920 of 2,293,764 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #410,256 of 2,293,764 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature