How to stand up for non-cognitivists

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):275-292 (1996)
Abstract
Is non-cognitivism compatible with minimalism about truth? A contemporary argument claims not, and therefore that moral realists, for example, should take heart from the popularity of semantic minimalism. The same is said to apply to cognitivism about other topics—conditionals, for example—for the argument depends only on the fact that ordinary usage applies the notions of truth and falsity to utterances of the kind in question. Given this much, minimalism about truth is said to leave no room for the view that the utterances concerned are non-cognitive in nature
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048409612347251
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,829
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):307 – 330.
Concepts, Analysis, Generics and the Canberra Plan.Mark Johnston & Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):113-171.
Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism.James Lenman - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):32–57.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Minimalism About Truth.Richard Holton - 1993 - In B. Garrett & K. Mulligan (eds.), Themes from Wittgenstein. ANU Working Papers in Philosophy 4.
Cognitivism About Imperatives.Josh Parsons - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):49-54.
Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth.James Dreier - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.
Non-Cognitivism and Inconsistency.Folke Tersman - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):361-372.
Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

169 ( #27,576 of 2,178,178 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #45,087 of 2,178,178 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums