Radical scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemic value

Abstract
It is argued that it is beneficial to view the debate regarding radical scepticism through the lens of epistemic value. In particular, it is claimed that we should regard radical scepticism as aiming to deprive us of an epistemic standing that is of special value to us, and that this methodological constraint on our dealings with radical scepticism potentially has important ramifications for how we assess the success of an anti-sceptical strategy.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2008.00160.x
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
In Defence of Virtue Epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):409-433.
Knowledge and Virtue: Response to Kelp.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):589 – 596.

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