Synthese:1-14 (forthcoming)

Authors
Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
The idea that truth is the fundamental epistemic good is explained and defended. It is argued that this proposal has been prematurely rejected on grounds that are both independently problematic and which also turn on an implausible way of understanding the proposal. A more compelling account of what it means for truth to be the fundamental epistemic good is then developed, one that treats the intellectual virtues, and thereby virtuous inquiry, as the primary theoretical notion.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02418-z
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The Virtue of Curiosity.Lewis Ross - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):105-120.

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