Erkenntnis:1-22 (forthcoming)

Authors
Maura Priest
Arizona State University
Abstract
A necessary criterion of Duncan Pritchard’s Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology is his safety condition. A believer cannot know p unless her belief is safe. Her belief is safe only if p could not have easily been false. But “easily” is not to be understood probabilistically. The chance that p is false might be extremely low and yet p remains unsafe. This is what happens, Pritchard argues, in lottery examples and explains why knowledge is not a function of the probabilistic strength of one’s evidence. This paper argues that, contra Pritchard, modality holds no epistemic advantage over this type of “probabilistic evidentialism” that he criticizes. I begin with a review of Pritchard’s argument supporting modality over probability; second, I explain the problems with this argument, and third, I offer an alternative explanation of the lottery example. At the completion of the paper, modality and probability are on equal epistemic footing.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-020-00292-7
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References found in this work BETA

Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
The Myth of Conventional Implicature.Kent Bach - 1999 - Linguistics and Philosophy 22 (4):327-366.
Skepticism and Contextualism.Ernest Sosa - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):1-18.
Safety-Based Epistemology: Wither Now?Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:33-45.
Knowledge Claims and Context: Loose Use.Wayne A. Davis - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395-438.

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