Abstract
In this article I attempt to overcome extant obstacles in deriving fundamental, objective and logically
deduced definitions of personhood and their rights, by introducing an a priori paradigm of beings and morality. I
do so by drawing a distinction between entities that are sought as ends and entities that are sought as means to
said ends. The former entities, I offer, are the essence of personhood and are considered precious by observers
possessing a logical system of valuation. The latter entities – those sought only as a means to an end – I term
‘materials.’ Materials are sought for their conditional value: Important for achieving sought ends, they are not
considered precious in and of themselves. A normative system for how this dichotomy of entities should interact
is consequently derived and introduced. This paradigm has applicability for modern humanism and beyond.
Assuming societal technological progression whereby human bodies and their surrounding infrastructures
continue to evolve and integrate, the distinction between beings and their supporting materials, and a moral code
for their interactions, will become ever more relevant.