Metaphilosophy 46 (3):436-461 (2015)

Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine
In this article it is argued that the standard theoretical account of risk in the contemporary literature, which is cast along probabilistic lines, is flawed, in that it is unable to account for a particular kind of risk. In its place a modal account of risk is offered. Two applications of the modal account of risk are then explored. First, to epistemology, via the defence of an anti-risk condition on knowledge in place of the normal anti-luck condition. Second, to legal theory, where it is shown that this account of risk can cast light on the debate regarding the extent to which a criminal justice system can countenance the possibility of wrongful convictions
Keywords philosophy of law  risk  luck  knowledge  epistemology  evidence
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DOI 10.1111/meta.12142
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.

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Citations of this work BETA

Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics.Jonathan Pugh - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.

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