International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (3):433-458 (2010)
AbstractThe two main challenges of the theory of conceptual content presented by Robert Brandom in Making It Explicit are to account for a referential dimension of conceptual content and to account for the objectivity of conceptual norms. Brandom tries to meet both these challenges in chapter 8 of his book. I argue that the accounts presented there can only be understood if seen against the background of Brandom's theory of communication developed in chapter 7. This theory is motivated by the well-known problem that semantic holism threatens the possibility of communication because it has the consequence that words mean different things in different mouths. Brandom offers a solution to this problem in terms of what he calls recurrence commitments. I show that chapter 8 of Making It Explicit should be understood as arguing that a practice that includes acknowledging interpersonal recurrence commitments institutes both conceptual contents with a referential dimension and objective conceptual norms. I close by raising the objection that Brandom's argument can only show that conceptual norms are communally shared and not that they are objective. I propose an emendation of this argument, having recourse to a practice Brandom refers to as rational rectification in his new book Between Saying and Doing
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References found in this work
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition.Saul Kripke - 1982 - Harvard University Press.
Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism.Robert Brandom - 2000 - Harvard University Press.
Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
Citations of this work
Politicizing Brandom's Pragmatism: Normativity and the Agonal Character of Social Practice.Thomas Fossen - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):371-395.
A Problem for Cognitive Load Theory—the Distinctively Human Life‐Form.Jan Derry - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (1):5-22.
Bringing Inferentialism to Science Education.Edward Causton - 2019 - Science & Education 28 (1-2):25-43.
Hegel and the Ethics of Brandom’s Metaphysics.Jonathan Lewis - 2018 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 10 (2):1-21.
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