Robert Brandom on Communication, Reference, and Objectivity

The two main challenges of the theory of conceptual content presented by Robert Brandom in Making It Explicit are to account for a referential dimension of conceptual content and to account for the objectivity of conceptual norms. Brandom tries to meet both these challenges in chapter 8 of his book. I argue that the accounts presented there can only be understood if seen against the background of Brandom's theory of communication developed in chapter 7. This theory is motivated by the well-known problem that semantic holism threatens the possibility of communication because it has the consequence that words mean different things in different mouths. Brandom offers a solution to this problem in terms of what he calls recurrence commitments. I show that chapter 8 of Making It Explicit should be understood as arguing that a practice that includes acknowledging interpersonal recurrence commitments institutes both conceptual contents with a referential dimension and objective conceptual norms. I close by raising the objection that Brandom's argument can only show that conceptual norms are communally shared and not that they are objective. I propose an emendation of this argument, having recourse to a practice Brandom refers to as rational rectification in his new book Between Saying and Doing
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Reprint years 2011
DOI 10.1080/09672559.2010.494439
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References found in this work BETA
Wittgenstein on Following a Rule.John McDowell - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):325-364.

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Inferentialism, Culture and Public Deliberation.Leonardo Marchettoni - 2014 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 40 (1):25-42.

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