Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology

Humanities 2 (3):351-368 (2013)

Authors
Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine
Christopher Ranalli
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a conception of the skeptical problem which generates metaepistemological ramifications for anti-skeptical theories. In particular, we argue that, contra Williams, Rorty’s view that Davidson was offering a theoretical diagnosis of radical skepticism can be consistently maintained with his transcendental approach.
Keywords Transcendental Arguments  Richard Rorty  Michael Williams  Donald Davidson  Radical Skepticism
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References found in this work BETA

Knowing One's Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5-20.
.Ernest LePore & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) - 1985 - Blackwell.
Scepticism and the Senses.Barry Stroud - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):559-570.

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