Philosophical Quarterly 29 (117):289-301 (1979)

Authors
Graham Priest
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
The paper argues for two theses: a) there are certain truths which are analytic; b) these are true by convention. Much of the paper deals with quine's arguments against these claims. The paper starts by accepting quine's network theory of belief and arguing that this presupposes a certain concept of rule following. This may be used to define analyticity. The paper then discusses the conventional nature of rule following and argues that this implies the conventional truth of analytic truths. Quine's arguments against truth by convention are then disarmed. Finally, The paper shows that the account of analyticity given gives rise to a modal logic in the order of s4, Disarming another argument against conventionalism
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DOI 10.2307/2219445
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