Humana Mente 14 (39) (2021)

Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine
The intellectual virtues are defined, in part, in terms of a love for the truth: veritic desire. Unpacking this idea is complicated, however, not least because of the difficulty of understanding the truth goal that is associated with veritic desire. In particular, it is argued that this cannot be formulated in terms of the maximization of one’s true beliefs. What is required, it is claimed, is a conception of veritic desire as aiming at understanding the fundamental nature of reality, where this is a virtuous refinement of a crude drive for truth, as opposed to being a way of combining a love of the truth with a further independent good.
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