Metaphilosophy 39 (1):66–88 (2008)
In this article I return to an argument that I presented in earlier work to the effect that virtue epistemology is at worse false and at best unmotivated. In the light of recent responses to this argument from such figures as John Greco, Guy Axtell, and Kelly Becker, I here re-state and re-evaluate this argument. In the process the original argument is refined and supplemented in key respects and some of the main charges against it are shown to be unfounded. Nevertheless, I also argue that at least one of the objections to the original argument—due to Becker—may well be on the right lines, and I draw some conclusions in this regard.
|Keywords||becker kelly, epistemology, luck, Reliabilism, virtue|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge Under Threat.Tomas Bogardus - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.
Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):133 - 151.
Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):437–447.
Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.
JFGI: From Distributed Cognition to Distributed Reliabilism.Kourken Michaelian - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):314-346.
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