Topoi 40 (5):1117-1125 (2021)

Authors
Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
Deep disagreements concern our most basic and fundamental commitments. Such disagreements seem to be problematic because they appear to manifest epistemic incommensurability in our epistemic systems, and thereby lead to epistemic relativism. This problem is confronted via consideration of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology. On the face of it, this proposal exacerbates the problem of deep disagreements by granting that our most fundamental commitments are essentially arationally held. It is argued, however, that a hinge epistemology, properly understood, does not licence epistemic incommensurability or epistemic relativism at all. On the contrary, such an epistemology in fact shows us how to rationally respond to deep disagreements. It is claimed that if we can resist these consequences even from the perspective of a hinge epistemology, then we should be very suspicious of the idea that deep disagreements in general are as epistemologically problematic as has been widely supposed.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11245-018-9612-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,261
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.

View all 47 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3):51-66.
Replies to Commentators.Nuno Venturinha - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1713-1724.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):983-998.
Wittgenstein and Deep Disagreement.Ranalli Chris - 2017 - The Philosophers' Magazine 79:50-55.
The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements.Kirk Lougheed - 2018 - Informal Logic 38 (2):263-292.
An Alternative to Relativism.John K. Davis - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.
Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (2):96-130.
Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
The Methodological Usefulness of Deep Disagreement.Steven W. Patterson - 2015 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 6 (2).
Closure, Deduction and Hinge Commitments.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3533-3551.
Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3):51-66.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-11-15

Total views
143 ( #75,673 of 2,455,872 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #31,558 of 2,455,872 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes