What should a deflationist about truth say about meaning?

Philosophical Issues 8:107-115 (1997)

Huw Price
Cambridge University
Paul Horwich aims to apply some the lessons of deflationism about truth to the debate about the nature of a theory of meaning. Having pacified the philosophical debate about truth to his satisfaction, he wants to use a bridge between truth and meaning to extend the same peace−making techniques into new territory. His goal is to make the debate about meaning more hospitable for an account based on use, by showing that certain apparent obstacles to such a theory are illusory, given deflationism about truth.
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DOI 10.2307/1522997
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