A DDL Approach to Pluralistic Ignorance and Collective Belief

Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):499-515 (2014)
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A group is in a state of pluralistic ignorance (PI) if, roughly speaking, every member of the group thinks that his or her belief or desire is different from the beliefs or desires of the other members of the group. PI has been invoked to explain many otherwise puzzling phenomena in social psychology. The main purpose of this article is to shed light on the nature of PI states – their structure, internal consistency and opacity – using the formal apparatus of Dynamic Doxastic Logic, and also to study the sense in which such states are “fragile”, i.e. to identify plausible conditions under which a PI state cascades into a state of shared belief as the result of announcement.



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Author Profiles

Erik J. Olsson
Lund University
Carlo Proietti
University of Amsterdam

References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Dynamic logic for belief revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
Ludwig Wittgenstein.Norman Malcolm - 1958 - New York,: Oxford University Press. Edited by G. H. von Wright & Ludwig Wittgenstein.

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