In Alfred Archer & Andre Grahlé (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Admiration. New York: Rowman & Little International. pp. 45-60 (2019)

Authors
Sara Protasi
University of Puget Sound
Abstract
In this chapter, I argue that a certain kind of envy is not only morally permissible, but also, sometimes, more fitting and productive than admiration. Envy and admiration are part of our emotional palette, our toolbox of evolutionary adaptations, and they play complementary roles. I start by introducing my original taxonomy of envy, which allows me to present emulative envy, a species of envy sometimes confused with admiration. After reviewing how the two emotions differ from a psychological perspective, I focus in particular on the distinct and complementary roles they play in the ethical and political domains.
Keywords admiration  envy  emulative envy  benign envy  admiring envy
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References found in this work BETA

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.
The Weirdest People in the World?Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine & Ara Norenzayan - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):61-83.
Varieties of Envy.Sara Protasi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):535-549.
Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Citations of this work BETA

An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Value of Envy.Jens Lange & Sara Protasi - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.

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