How to Distinguish Secondary from Primary Creations? A Leibnizian Elucidation of a Distinction by J.R.R. Tolkien

Hither Shore 14 (1):34-45 (2020)
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Abstract

Tolkien uses the terms “primary creation” and “secondary creation” in his works with reference to divine and human creation respectively. In the first part of this paper, I argue that one criterion to distinguish the former from the latter is their completeness or incompleteness. The primary creation is complete because it is thought of and created by God. The secondary creations like human fictions are incomplete since the human intellect is finite and does not have the capacity to grasp the entire structure of its own creation. In the second part, I will examine this distinction in relation to Tolkien’s Christian background, and reformulate and systematise it in the metaphysical framework of G.W. Leibniz. Finally, I offer a definition of a human fiction as a part of a divine fiction, i.e. as a part of a possible world in a Leibnizian sense.

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Jan Levin Propach
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

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