How voluntary are minimal actions?

Abstract

This book chapter aims at exploring how intentional a piece of behavior should be to count as an action, and how a minimal view on action, not requiring a richly intentional causation, may still qualify such a behavior as voluntary.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

My notes

Similar books and articles

Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action.Aaron Schurger & Sebo Uithol - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):761-778.
Aquinas on threats and temptations.Paul Hoffman - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2):225–242.
Four Teleological Orders of Human Action.Quentin Smith - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (3):213-230.
Subjective agency and awareness of shared actions.Lars Strother, Kristin A. House & Sukhvinder S. Obhi - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):12-20.
Locke on the Suspension of Desire. Chappell - 1998 - Locke Studies 29:23-38.
How we act: causes, reasons, and intentions.Berent Enç - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Attempt, success and action generation.Daniel Vanderveken - 2002 - Manuscrito 25 (3):323-356.
The interaction of cortex and basal ganglia in the control of voluntary actions.G. Roth - 2003 - In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press. pp. 115--132.
Thomas Aquinas' Theory of Voluntary Action.Ji-Xuan Zhang - 2005 - Philosophy and Culture 32 (5):133-149.
Why volition is a foundation issue for psychology.Bernard J. Baars - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):281-309.
Minimal Cooperation.Cédric Paternotte - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1):0048393112457428.
Voluntary action: brains, minds, and sociality.Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.) - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Instrumental Structure of Actions.Markos Valaris - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):64-83.
Judging as a non-voluntary action.Conor McHugh - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.
Hedonic value of intentional action provides reinforcement for voluntary generation but not voluntary inhibition of action.Jim Parkinson & Patrick Haggard - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1253-1261.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-07-05

Downloads
29 (#538,668)

6 months
1 (#1,516,429)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joëlle Proust
Institut Jean Nicod

Citations of this work

Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy.Joëlle Proust - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):717-743.
Self-agency and mental causality.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Intencionalnost i intencionalno djelovanje.Shaun Gallagher - 2006 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2):339-346.
Intentionalität und intentionales handeln.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):319-326.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 19 references / Add more references