Authors
Sara Protasi
University of Puget Sound
Abstract
I argue for the view that envy and jealousy are distinct emotions, whose crucial difference is that envy involves a perception of lack while jealousy involves a perception of loss. I start by noting the common practice of using ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ almost interchangeably, and I contrast it with the empirical evidence that shows that envy and jealousy are distinct, albeit similar and often co-occurring, emotions. I then argue in favor of a specific way of understanding their distinction: the view that envy is a response to a perceived lack of a valuable object, while jealousy is a response to a perceived loss of a valuable object. I compare such a view with the most compelling alternative theories, and show that it accounts better for paradigmatic cases. I conclude by showing how the lack vs. loss model can handle complications: ambiguous cases, that is, when it is epistemically unclear whether one experiences lack or loss; hybrid cases, that is, when one seems to experience both lack and loss; and borderline cases, that is, when it is metaphysically unclear whether one experiences lack or loss.
Keywords jealousy  envy  emotions
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/apa.2017.18
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Varieties of Envy.Sara Protasi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):535-549.
The Subtlety of Emotions.[author unknown] - 2001 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 63 (4):810-811.
Deadly Vices.Gabriele Taylor - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Comprehending Envy.Richard Smith & Sung Hee Kim - 2007 - Psychological Bulletin 133:46-64.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Emotion.Charlie Kurth - 2022 - Routledge.
Ressentiment.Andrew Huddleston - 2021 - Ethics 131 (4):670-696.
Envy and Us.Alessandro Salice & Alba Montes Sánchez - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):227-242.
Happy Self-Surrender and Unhappy Self-Assertion: A Comparison Between Admiration and Emulative Envy.Sara Protasi - 2019 - In Alfred Archer & Andre Grahlé (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Admiration. New York: Rowman & Little International. pp. 45-60.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Jealous Thoughts.Jerome Neu - 1980 - In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions. Univ of California Pr. pp. 425--463.
Jealousy in Relation to Envy.Luke Purshouse - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (2):179-205.
Moral Vice, Cognitive Virtue.Thomas Williams - 2003 - Philosophy and Literature 27 (1):223-230.
Envy and Its Discontents.Timothy Perrine & Kevin Timpe - 2014 - In Kevin Timpe & Craig Boyd (eds.), Virtues and Their Vices. Oxford University Press. pp. 225-244.
Are Envy, Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions?Aaron Ben-Ze'ev - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.
Envy: The Seven Deadly Sins.Joseph Epstein - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Envy and Jealousy: Emotions and Vices.Gabriele Taylor - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1):233-249.
The Moral Value of Envy.Krista K. Thomason - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):36-53.
Varieties of Envy.Sara Protasi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):535-549.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-07-10

Total views
1,237 ( #4,667 of 2,518,488 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
227 ( #2,179 of 2,518,488 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes