Kant's first paralogism

Philosophical Review 119 (4):449–495 (2010)
Authors
Ian Proops
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
In “The Paralogisms of Pure Reason” Kant seeks to explain how rationalist philosophers could have arrived at the dogmatic conclusion that the self is a substance. His diagnosis has two components: first, the positing of “Transcendental Illusion”—a pervasive intellectual illusion that predisposes us to accept as sound certain unsound arguments for substantive theses about the nature of the self; second, the identification of the relevant fallacy we commit when we succumb to this illusion. This paper explains how these two elements combine to produce the doctrine that the self is a substance. It is argued that Kant has a novel, ingenious—and even somewhat plausible—account of how the rational psychologist might arrive at this view-- one that involves identifying a fundamental confusion about the nature of conceivability.
Keywords Kant  Paralogism  self  Transcendental Illusion  substance  soul  rational metaphysics  speculative metaphysics  Dialectic  Critique of Pure Reason
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-2010-011
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First Person Illusions: Are They Descartes', or Kant's?Christopher Peacocke - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):247-275.

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