Philosophical Review 119 (4):449–495 (2010)

Authors
Ian Proops
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
In the part of the first Critique known as “The Paralogisms of Pure Reason” Kant seeks to explain how even the most acute metaphysicians could have arrived, through speculation, at the ruefully dogmatic conclusion that the self (understood as the subject of thoughts or "thinking I") is a substance. His diagnosis has two components: first, the positing of the phenomenon of “Transcendental Illusion”—an illusion, modelled on but distinct from, optical illusion--that predisposes human beings to accept as sound--and as known to sound--certain in fact flawed arguments for substantive theses about the nature of the self; second, the identification of the fallacy we commit when we succumb to this illusion. It is explained how these two elements combine to produce a central instance of (what Kant sees as) dogmatic speculative metaphysics, namely, the doctrine that the self is a substance in the sense of a necessarily non-inhering subject of inherence. It is argued that Kant has a novel, ingenious, and even somewhat plausible account of the route by which the rational psychologist arrives--or might arrive--at this view, an account that involves identifying a rather deep-rooted confusion about the very nature of conceivability.
Keywords Kant  Paralogism  self  Transcendental Illusion  substance  soul  rational metaphysics  speculative metaphysics  Dialectic  Critique of Pure Reason  Descartes
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1215/00318108-2010-011
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Belief in Kant.Andrew Chignell - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (3):323-360.
Kant's Analytic.Jonathan Bennett - 1966 - Cambridge University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.Günter Zöller - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):113.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

First Person Illusions: Are They Descartes', or Kant's?Christopher Peacocke - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):247-275.
Schiller on Evil and the Emergence of Reason.Owen Ware - 2018 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 35 (4):337-355.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-10-29

Total views
1,406 ( #2,716 of 2,427,842 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
190 ( #2,655 of 2,427,842 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes