European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):214-234 (2016)

Authors
Sara Protasi
University of Puget Sound
Abstract
The debate on love's reasons ignores unrequited love, which—I argue—can be as genuine and as valuable as reciprocated love. I start by showing that the relationship view of love cannot account for either the reasons or the value of unrequited love. I then present the simple property view, an alternative to the relationship view that is beset with its own problems. In order to solve these problems, I present a more sophisticated version of the property view that integrates ideas from different property theorists in the love literature. However, even this more sophisticated property view falls short in accounting for unrequited love's reasons. In response, I develop a new version of the property view that I call the experiential view. On this view, we love a person not only in virtue of properties shaped by and experienced in a reciprocal loving relationship, but also in virtue of perspectival properties, whose value can be properly assessed also outside of a reciprocal loving relationship. The experiential view is the only view that can account not only for reciprocated love's reasons, but also for unrequited love's reasons.
Keywords romantic love  unrequited love  relationships  Niko Kolodny  non-ideal value
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1111/ejop.12077
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References found in this work BETA

The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ”Appropriateness' of Emotions.Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
Love as Valuing a Relationship.Niko Kolodny - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):135-189.
The Reasons of Love.Harry G. Frankfurt - 2006 - Princeton University Press.
The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Invideo Et Amo: On Envying the Beloved.Sara Protasi - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1765-1784.
Taking Love Seriously: McTaggart, Absolute Reality and Chemistry.Saunders Joe - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (4):719-737.
Love in Spite Of.Erich Hatala Matthes - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 6:241-262.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

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