Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (2):267-292 (2006)

Ian Proops
University of Texas at Austin
What is at stake philosophically for Russell in espousing logicism? I argue that Russell's aims are chiefly epistemological and mathematical in nature. Russell develops logicism in order to give an account of the nature of mathematics and of mathematical knowledge that is compatible with what he takes to be the uncontroversial status of this science as true, certain and exact. I argue for this view against the view of Peter Hylton, according to which Russell uses logicism to defend the unconditional truth of mathematics against various Idealist positions that treat mathematics as true only partially or only relative to a particular point of view.
Keywords Russell  logicism  Bradley  Hylton  idealism  monism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1353/hph.2006.0029
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,417
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Russell and Kant.J. Alberto Coffa - 1981 - Synthese 46 (2):247 - 263.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Frege, Dedekind, and the Origins of Logicism.Erich H. Reck - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):242-265.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
120 ( #89,202 of 2,449,042 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #223,039 of 2,449,042 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes