Russell’s reasons for logicism

Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (2):267-292 (2006)
Abstract
What is at stake philosophically for Russell in espousing logicism? I argue that Russell's aims are chiefly epistemological and mathematical in nature. Russell develops logicism in order to give an account of the nature of mathematics and of mathematical knowledge that is compatible with what he takes to be the uncontroversial status of this science as true, certain and exact. I argue for this view against the view of Peter Hylton, according to which Russell uses logicism to defend the unconditional truth of mathematics against various Idealist positions that treat mathematics as true only partially or only relative to a particular point of view.
Keywords Russell  logicism  Bradley  Hylton  idealism  monism
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2006.0029
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Frege, Dedekind, and the Origins of Logicism.Erich H. Reck - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):242-265.

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