Russell’s reasons for logicism

Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (2):267-292 (2006)
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Abstract

What is at stake philosophically for Russell in espousing logicism? I argue that Russell's aims are chiefly epistemological and mathematical in nature. Russell develops logicism in order to give an account of the nature of mathematics and of mathematical knowledge that is compatible with what he takes to be the uncontroversial status of this science as true, certain and exact. I argue for this view against the view of Peter Hylton, according to which Russell uses logicism to defend the unconditional truth of mathematics against various Idealist positions that treat mathematics as true only partially or only relative to a particular point of view.

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Ian Proops
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Frege, Dedekind, and the Origins of Logicism.Erich H. Reck - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):242-265.
Principia mathematica.A. D. Irvine - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Russell and Kant.J. Alberto Coffa - 1981 - Synthese 46 (2):247 - 263.

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