Philosophical Topics 25 (2):121-144 (1997)

Authors
Ian Proops
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
The paper argues that Wittgenstein's criticisms of Frege and Russell's assertion sign are, a bottom, criticisms of a common flaw in these philosophers' early conceptions of the proposition. Each philosopher offers an account of the proposition that *seems* to suggest that a sentence cannot get so far as to say something without the addition of the assertion sign. This leads to the mistaken idea that there is a coherent notion of "logical assertion.".
Keywords logical assertion  assertion  proposition  picture theory  picture  Frege  Russell  Wittgenstein  assertion sign  judgment stroke
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ISBN(s) 0276-2080
DOI 10.5840/philtopics19972524
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Truth in Frege.Richard Heck & Robert May - forthcoming - In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
The Logical Significance of Assertion: Frege on the Essence of Logic.Walter B. Pedriali - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (8).

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