The Early Wittgenstein on Logical Assertion

Philosophical Topics 25 (2):121-144 (1997)
Abstract
The paper argues that Wittgenstein's criticisms of Frege and Russell's assertion sign are, a bottom, criticisms of a common flaw in these philosophers' early conceptions of the proposition. Each philosopher offers an account of the proposition that *seems* to suggest that a sentence cannot get so far as to say something without the addition of the assertion sign. This leads to the mistaken idea that there is a coherent notion of "logical assertion.".
Keywords logical assertion  assertion  proposition  picture theory  picture  Frege  Russell  Wittgenstein  assertion sign  judgment stroke
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/philtopics19972524
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,224
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
97 ( #54,283 of 2,191,972 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #144,930 of 2,191,972 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature