In Michael Potter and Peter Sullivan (ed.), Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 76-96 (2013)

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Ian Proops
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
I argue that Frege's so-called "concept 'horse' problem" is not one problem but many. When these different sub-problems are distinguished, some emerge as more tractable than others. I argue that, contrary to a widespread scholarly assumption originating with Peter Geach, there is scant evidence that Frege engaged with the general problem of the inexpressibility of logical category distinctions in writings available to Wittgenstein. In consequence, Geach is mistaken in his claim that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein simply accepts from Frege certain lessons about the inexpressibility of logical category distinctions and the say-show distinction. In truth, Wittgenstein drew his own morals about these matters, quite possibly as the result of reflecting on how the general problem of the inexpressibility of logical category distinctions arises in Frege's writings , but also, quite possibly, by discerning certain glimmerings of these doctrines in the writings of Russell
Keywords Frege  concept  logical categories  category distinctions  showing  Wittgenstein  the concept horse  definite description  elucidation  hints
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Predication as Ascription.David Liebesman - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):517-569.
Why Did Frege Reject the Theory of Types?Wim Vanrie - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-20.
Frege’s Unmanageable Thing.Michael Price - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):368-413.
Naming the Concept Horse.Michael Price - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2727-2743.
Denoting and Disquoting.Michael Rieppel - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):548-561.

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