Faith and Philosophy 29 (4):400-415 (2012)

Authors
Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University
Abstract
Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is an argument that, possibly, God cannot actualize a world containing significant creaturely free will and no wrongdoings. I will argue that if standard Molinism is true, there is a pair of worlds w1 and w2 each of which contains a significantly free creature who never chooses wrongly, and that are such that, necessarily, at least one of these worlds is a world that God can actualize.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 0739-7046
DOI faithphil201229442
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References found in this work BETA

On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (2):109-117.
A Noncausal Theory of Agency.Stewart C. Goetz - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):303-316.
A New Free-Will Defence.Alexander R. Pruss - 2003 - Religious Studies 39 (2):211-223.

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Citations of this work BETA

Recent Work on Molinism.Ken Perszyk - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):755-770.
A Simpler Free Will Defence.C’Zar Bernstein & Nathaniel Helms - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):197-203.
Plantingian Theism and the Free-Will Defence.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (4):451-460.
The Free Will Defense Revisited: The Instrumental Value of Significant Free Will.Frederick Choo & Esther Goh - 2019 - International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science (4):32-45.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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