Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):487-500 (2009)
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| Abstract |
Persons have objective, not socially defined, identity conditions. I shall argue that robots do not, unless they have souls. Hence, robots without souls are not persons. And by parallel reasoning, neither are we persons if we do not have souls
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| Keywords | Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy and Religion |
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| ISBN(s) | 0739-7046 |
| DOI | 10.5840/faithphil200926550 |
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References found in this work BETA
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
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