Religious Studies 39 (2):211-223 (2003)

Authors
Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University
Abstract
This paper argues that if creatures are to have significant free will, then God's essential omni-benevolence and essential omnipotence cannot logically preclude Him from creating a world containing a moral evil. The paper maintains that this traditional conclusion does not need to rest on reliance on subjunctive conditionals of free will. It can be grounded in several independent ways based on premises that many will accept.
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DOI 10.1017/s0034412502006340
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On the Value of Freedom To Do Evil.Joshua Rasmussen - 2013 - Faith and Philosophy 30 (4):418-428.
Divine Responsibility Without Divine Freedom.Michael Bergmann & J. A. Cover - 2006 - Faith and Philosophy 23 (4):381-408.

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