Minds and Machines 20 (3):363-383 (2010)

Although activity aimed at the construction of artificial intelligence started about 60 years ago however, contemporary intelligent systems are effective in very narrow domains only. One of the reasons for this situation appears to be serious problems in the theory of intelligence. Intelligence is a characteristic of goal-directed systems and two classes of goal-directed systems can be derived from observations on animals and humans, one class is systems with innately and jointly determined goals and means. The other class contains systems that are able to construct arbitrary goals and means. It is suggested that the classes (that implicitly underlie most models of artificial intelligence) are insufficient to explain human goal-directed activity. A broader approach to goal-directed systems is considered. This approach suggests that humans are goal-directed systems that jointly synthesize arbitrary goals and means. Neural and psychological data favoring this hypothesis and its experimental validation are considered. A simple computer model based on the idea of joint synthesis to simulate goal-directed activity is presented. The usage of the idea of joint synthesis for the construction of artificial intelligence is discussed
Keywords Goal-directed activity   Intelligence   Self-organization   Synthesis
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-010-9218-7
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References found in this work BETA

Unified Theories of Cognition.Allen Newell - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
An Integrative Theory of Prefrontal Cortex Function.Earl K. Miller & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2001 - Annual Review of Neuroscience 24 (1):167-202.
In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning.Jonathan StB. T. Evans - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):454-459.
In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):454-459.

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