Faith and Philosophy 27 (2):190-196 (2010)

Authors
Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University
Abstract
I defend a simple argument for why considerations of epistemic probability should lead us away from Open Future views according to which claims about the future are never true
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 0739-7046
DOI 10.5840/faithphil201027217
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References found in this work BETA

On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.

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Citations of this work BETA

An Open Infinite Future is Impossible.Alexander R. Pruss - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (4):461-464.
Divine Providence.Hugh J. McCann - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Probability, Truth, and the Openness of the Future.Alan R. Rhoda - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (2):197-204.

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