Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2341-2348 (2015)

Authors
Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University
Abstract
We shall use Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem to show that consistency is not possibility, and then argue that the argument does serious damage to some theories of modality where consistency plays a major but not exclusive role
Keywords Modality  Consistency  Incompleteness  Possibility  Gödel
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-014-0414-9
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References found in this work BETA

Being Known.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
What We Disagree About When We Disagree About Ontology.Cian Dorr - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 234--86.
Fixing Frege.John P. Burgess - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Absolute Necessities.Bob Hale - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:93 - 117.

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Citations of this work BETA

Modality is Not Explainable by Essence.Carlos Romero - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):121-141.

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