Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):541 - 546 (2012)
Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University
I offer examples showing that, pace G. E. Moore, it is possible to assert ?Q and I don't believe that Q? sincerely, truly, and without any absurdity. The examples also refute the following principles: (a) justification to assert p entails justification to assert that one believes p (Gareth Evans); (b) the sincerity condition on assertion is that one believes what one says (John Searle); and (c) to assert (to someone) something that one believes to be false is to lie (Don Fallis)
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2011.611150
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
What Good Are Counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John R. Searle - 1969 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (79):172-179.
What Is Lying?Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.

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Citations of this work BETA

Dissonance and Moorean Propositions.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):107-127.
Unendorsed Beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):49-68.
Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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