Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):541 - 546 (2012)
| Abstract |
I offer examples showing that, pace G. E. Moore, it is possible to assert ?Q and I don't believe that Q? sincerely, truly, and without any absurdity. The examples also refute the following principles: (a) justification to assert p entails justification to assert that one believes p (Gareth Evans); (b) the sincerity condition on assertion is that one believes what one says (John Searle); and (c) to assert (to someone) something that one believes to be false is to lie (Don Fallis)
|
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2011.611150 |
| Options |
Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
|
Download optionsOur Archive
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy Papers currently archived: 30,694
External links
- From the Publisher via CrossRef (no proxy)
- bearspace.baylor.edu
(no proxy) - dx.doi.org (no proxy)
- tandfonline.com (no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver..
- Configure custom resolver
References found in this work BETA
A Reply to My Critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court.
View all 7 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.
Lying as a Violation of Grice's First Maxim of Quality.Don Fallis - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):563-581.
Assertions, Joint Epistemic Actions and Social Practices.Seumas Miller - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):71-94.
Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.
Similar books and articlesMoore's Paradoxes and Iterated Belief.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:145-168.
Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception.Andy Egan - 2008 - In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
Is the Liar Sentence Both True and False?Hartry Field - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Clarendon Press.
The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion.Rachel McKinnon - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):121-135.
Lying as a Violation of Grice's First Maxim of Quality.Don Fallis - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):563-581.
What We Mean, What We Think We Mean, and How Language Surprises Us.Barry C. Smith - 2010 - In E. Romero & B. Soria (eds.), Explicit Communication: Robyn Carston's Pragmatics. Palgrave.
First-Person Propositions.Peter W. Hanks - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):155-182.
Added to PP index
2011-09-21
Total downloads
67 ( #81,305 of 2,197,252 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #298,963 of 2,197,252 )
2011-09-21
Total downloads
67 ( #81,305 of 2,197,252 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #298,963 of 2,197,252 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Monthly downloads
My notes
