Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):541 - 546 (2012)

Authors
Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University
Abstract
I offer examples showing that, pace G. E. Moore, it is possible to assert ?Q and I don't believe that Q? sincerely, truly, and without any absurdity. The examples also refute the following principles: (a) justification to assert p entails justification to assert that one believes p (Gareth Evans); (b) the sincerity condition on assertion is that one believes what one says (John Searle); and (c) to assert (to someone) something that one believes to be false is to lie (Don Fallis)
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2011.611150
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.William P. Alston - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (79):172-179.
What Good Are Counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.
What Is Lying?Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.
Davidson Was Almost Right About Lying.Don Fallis - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):337-353.
Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.
Dissonance and Moorean Propositions.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):107-127.
Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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